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Abstract
This paper attempts to explain the rates of European protest in three core countries of the EEC/EU
– the Belgium, France, and Germany – over a sixteen-year period from 1980 to 1995 based on their
institutional differences as suggested by the literature on political opportunity structures. 
First, the findings support the notion of a Europeanization of protest that is spurred by the changing
constellation of national vs. supranational powers in the wake of European integration. The
Europeanization of protest occurs, displaying systematic cross-national differences. These
differences are, as the results suggest, related to the differential between the constraints of the
actors' domestic environments and the common-to-all evolving opportunities on the level of
European politics. 
Secondly, the findings suggest that the rates of protest in cross-national perspective are not simply
random. The macro-political structure plays a (statistically) significant, logically consistent, and
visible role in the explanatory bundle leading to occurrence or absence of protest actions. 
Kurzfassung
Ausgehend von den theoretischen Vorschlägen des Konzepts der "politischen
Opportunitätsstrukturen" untersucht die folgende Studie den Zusammenhang zwischen der
Häufigkeit europäischen Protestes in drei Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften –
Belgien, Frankreich und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – und den jeweiligen institutionellen
Rahmenbedingungen der drei politischen Systeme über eine Zeitspanne von sechzehn Jahren (1980
bis 1995). 
Die Ergebnisse deuten zum einen darauf hin, daß die Europäisierung von Protesten mitbestimmt
werden von der sich als Folge der europäischen Integration verändernden Konstellation zwischen
nationalen und supranationalen Politikkompetenzen. Im zwischenstaatlichen Vergleich zeigen sich
deutliche und systematische Unterschiede in der Häufigkeit europäischen Protestes. Diese
Unterschiede werden hier erklärt als das Ergebnis des Differentials zwischen dem spezifischen
institutionellen Umfeld auf nationaler Ebene zum einen und den allen Akteuren gemeinsamen
Möglichkeiten zur Partizipation auf supranationaler Ebene zum anderen. 
Darüber hinaus scheint die Häufigkeit europäischen Protestes in vergleichender Perspektive nicht
zufällig: Vielmehr üben die makropolitischen Strukturen als zentrale Erklärungsfaktoren einen
statistisch signifikanten und logisch folgerichtigen Einfluß auf das Auftreten oder Ausbleiben von
Protestaktionen aus. 
The author
Uwe K.H. Reising is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Department of Political Science
University of Kansas; email: ureis@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
1 von 1 17.07.98 09:38
EIoP: Text 1998-005: Abstract http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-005a.htmDomestic and supranational political opportunities: European protest in selected
countries 1980-1995(*)
Uwe K.H. Reising
European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 2 (1998) N° 5; 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-005a.htm
Date of Publication in  : 17.7.1998
| Abstract | Back to homepage | 
| This paper's comments page | Send your comment! to this paper |
Contents:
I. Introduction 
II. Institutional changes in EEC and the opening of political opportunities for protest 
III. European integration and the expanding arena for political activism 
IV. Data 
V. Testing POS in the European Context 
VI. Results 
VII. Concluding remarks 
References 
1
I. Introduction
This paper focuses on an empirical analysis of the concept of political opportunity structure (POS)
and its impact on the ”Europeanization of protest.” Can we explain the occurrence and different rates
of European protest in three countries with institutional differences? 
I analyze POS through contentious collective action, or protest, by citizens of three member countries
of the European Union – the Belgium, France, and Germany – over a sixteen-year period from 1980
to 1995. 
I examine whether and how citizens in selected member countries of the European Union respond to
the increasing shift of political power from their national governments to the institutions of the
European Union. Particularly, I am interested in whether the concept of POS allows us correctly to
determine the level of protest directed at the European Union institutions or responding to European
Union-influenced policies. Several authors have suggested that the growth of multi-level governance
in Europe has created new opportunities for citizens' participation (Marks and McAdam 1996).
While this argument has an immediate intuitive appeal, social scientists have not been very
successful in devising rigorous empirical tests of the impact of POS. Indeed, the unresolved debate
on the importance of structural vs. individual factors explaining contentious collective action is one
of the most fundamental questions in the present debate on the study of protest and contentious
politics (Lichbach 1997a; McAdam, Tilly, Tarrow 1997). 
Analyzing contentious politics within the European Union provides a unique possibility to test the
impact of domestic macro-structures on protest in a less ambiguous way. Within the context of the
European Union one can investigate how differences in – the member countries' domestic political
opportunities translate into the common-to-all, supranational level of governance, the arena of
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function of structural characteristics of the respective states? Or more precisely, is European protest a
function of the domestic-supranational POS-differential?
If the on-going process of European integration indeed creates new possibilities for non-state actors
to press their grievances and claims, then the notion of political opportunity structure should provide
a powerful diagnostic tool that would allow us to explain systematic cross-national differences in the
patterns of European protest as being determined by the differential between different domestic and
the common-to-all supranational POS. 
In order to address these questions, I use a rich set of event data on domestic and European protest
and compare the development of European protest in the three countries with the countries' structural
characteristics. I distinguish between, first, general protest in each of the countries, second, protest
within the individual countries that is directed towards or affected by the existence of the European
Union, and third, ”pure” European protest, at the location of EU institutions and as a product of
transnational European coordination.
At the center of this analysis is the concept of political opportunity structure (POS), or more
precisely, the formal and institutional dimensions of POS. The concept of POS originates in Michael
Lipsky's (1970) and Peter Eisinger's (1973) studies of urban unrest in America. Since then it has
become one of the explanatory "workhorses" in the comparative study of social movements and
protest (Tarrow 1983; for a review of its origins see e.g., McAdam 1996; McAdam, Tilly, Tarrow
1997). Based in the tradition of structuralist approaches students of contentious politics theorize POS
to be one of the central contributing factors of contentious political action. 
The study of social movements and contentious politics distinguishes between three levels: between
political opportunities – addressing macro-conditions of collective action – , mobilizing structures –
the meso-level organizational building blocks for social movements, and framing processes – the
cognitive, "ideational" or cultural dimension of collective action (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald
1996). In their recent review McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) advocate a theoretical synthesis in
the study of social movements that encompasses those three perspectives – political opportunity,
mobilizing structures and cultural frames – capturing the role of politics, society and culture
respectively. In their view these three aspects interactively determine the formation and success of
collective action (CA). Within this triad, the concept of political opportunity has been central in the
study of social movements: POS has been hypothesized to explain the emergence of a movement on
the basis of ”changes in the institutional structure or informal power relations of a given national
political system.” (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 3) Similarly, the political process paradigm
assumes that ”expanding political opportunities as the ultimate spur to CA.” (McAdam, McCarthy
and Zald 1996: 7)
Political opportunity structures are commonly defined along four main dimensions (e.g. Kriesi 1995:
168): (1) the degree of openness or closure of formal political access, (2) the degree of stability or
instability of political alignments, (3) the availability and strategic posture of potential alliance
partners, and (4) the political conflicts within and among elites. Yet, there are also a number of
differences with respect to emphasis and operationalization (for a recent review see McAdam 1996).
For example, Kriesi's (1995) operationalization is based on the notion of stability: he assumes the
general structure as being given and stable. And although he acknowledges the possibility of changes
over time, the central point for him is, ”that the actors cannot anticipate such shifts at the time when
they engage in collective action, which means that they have to take the political opportunity
structure as a given in their short-term strategic calculations.” (Kriesi 1995: 168)
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Alternatively, Tarrow's (1994: 86-88) operationalization of POS stresses its dynamic aspects. He
specifies POS as changes in opportunity: (1) opening up of access to participation, (2) shifts in ruling
alignments – a central factor in democratic systems – , (3) availability of influential allies, and (4)
cleavages within and among elites. Here, social changes are crucial in that they can "render the
established political order more vulnerable or receptive to change.” (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald
1996: 8)(1)
However, shared among those typologies (see McAdam 1996) of political opportunity and protest is
the idea that the formal institutional structure of a polity defines the general setting for the interaction
between challengers (protesters, social movements, dissidents) and the regime, and that changes
along the four dimensions affect some kind of equilibrium between the challenging groups and the
state (McAdam 1996, 32). Thus, a polity's formal institutional or legal structure is a crucial factor in
determining the conflict and alliance systems that patterns social movement emergence and
development (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995: 4). Applied empirical research into the role of
political opportunity structures has consisted of both single case studies (”the American perspective”)
and cross-national comparisons (”the European scholars”). As McAdam, McCarthy and Zald point
out (1996: 18), the POS concept is particularly suited for comparative research across regions,
movements, or national contexts. Comparativists attempt to explain cross-national variations in
possible institutional locations of mobilization, the role of the political system in structuring the
organizational profile of the movement, or the role of structure for movement survival. The first
cross-national comparison of the effects of political opportunity structures is Kitschelt's (1986),
studying differences in anti-nuclear movements in four countries. He examines whether
cross-national differences in social movement strategies and amount and type of social movement
activities, are a function of POS defined as input and output structures of the political system. 
Taking Kitschelt's study as their starting point, Kriesi and collaborators (1995) analyze the role of
political opportunity structure in explaining the occurrence and repertoires of New Social
Movements in Western Europe. Recently, Koopmans (1996) uses another derivative of the POS
concept to explain cross-national differences in extreme rightist violence. He operationalizes political
opportunities as the public position that political elites take in political debate surrounding asylum
legislation in Germany.
While the use of POS in these studies provides at times a powerful heuristic and explanatory
metaphor, its application is, at the same time, marred by serious methodological shortcomings. Those
range from ambiguous specification, murky data, and the absence of systematic analysis, to
make-shift and ad-hoc utilization of POS as the explanatory concept, that is made to bear the weight
of the analysis in the final paragraphs without having been part of the research design in the first
place. Some of the methodological problems in the application of the POS concept are not
coincidental, nor necessarily due to sloppy research designs. The main problem in the testing the
POS is its vagueness. 
Not surprisingly then, the criticism of the POS concept has lately been rising in pitch. During its rise
to the center of social movement theory the concept has become bloated and overloaded: it has lost
much of its explanatory edge by incorporating an increasing array of causal factors. Furthermore, its
vague content and often contradictory causal direction have rendered it vague and ambiguous,
leaving it for practical research both potentially unfalsifiable and thus unassailable. Gamson and
Meyer (1996: 275) invoke Tilly's famous criticism of Ted Gurr's relative deprivation paradigm by
attacking POS as a "sponge." They are concerned that POS "threatens to become an all-encompassing
fudge factor for all the conditions and circumstances that form the context for collective action. Used
to explain so much, it may ultimately explain nothing at all."(Gamson and Meyer 1996: 275)
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research program has come from Mark Lichbach (e.g. Lichbach 1997b) and his Collective Action
Research Program (CARP). Grounded in work of political economists such as Mancur Olson,
Gordon Tullock, and sociologists like Gamson, CARP is concerned with problems of free-riding and
non-participation in contentious politics. Based on assumptions of the preeminence of self-interest
and instrumental rationality, it extends the insight that collective action involves public goods and
"perverse" aggregation outcomes like Prisoner's Dilemma characteristics to the study of protest and
rebellion (Lichbach 1997b: 90). CARP stresses solutions to the collective action problem as its basic
building blocks and sees the struggle between challengers and authorities in the realization of those
solutions as the essential political aspect of collective dissent (Lichbach 1995). The contribution of
CARP that in their view goes beyond the POS research program, is the conviction that CA theories
"lead to a study of the causes and consequences of collective dissent (i.e., CA processes) and to
comparative and historical analyses of the strategic situations in which regimes and dissidents
confront one another." (Lichbach 1997b: 92) Consequently, Lichbach challenges the limitations and
boundaries of the "Synthetic Political Opportunity Theory" (SPOT): in his view (1997a: 23) an
exclusive focus on the structural or macro-level that neglects the micro-level of group processes
spurred by dissent replaces "the study of dissent with the study of authority systems against which
dissent is conducted."
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While researchers working close to the CARP acknowledge the importance of structural conditions,
such as the type of state institutions and the institutional environment within which collective action
takes place (see Lichbach 1995: 336-337), in their practical research the focus is placed on aspects of
agency of collective action rather than on the structure. Lichbach questions the usefulness of the four
dimensions of political opportunity structure as explanations of levels of protest. In his view the basic
problem of the concept – the structural shortcoming of structural explanations so to speak – is that
the relationship between POS and protest is basically indeterminate and holds instead that
"[h]appenstance determines context; politics decides solutions. Ergo, aggregate levels and particular
outbreaks of collective dissent are unpredictable." (Lichbach 1995: 281-282)
Scholars working within the tradition of structural explanations acknowledge many of these
problems (e.g. Rucht 1996b: 188; Tarrow 1988: 430). At its best, the POS can only explain part of
the mobilization process because it constitutions only a necessary and not sufficient condition for
collective action – or in Most and Starr's (1989) poignant terminology it is the difference between
"opportunity" and "willingness."
Thus, the explanatory power of POS is potentially contingent on a number of mediating factors such
as the mobilizing strategy of a movement, on the current stage in the mobilization process (the
assumption being that POS are more crucial for the onset of a movement), and size and importance
of social movements and their ability to generate their own POS (see Kriesi et al. 1995: xv). 
With these limitations in mind, in the next section I portray the potential for contentious collective
action within the evolving environment of the European Economic Communities/European Union
(EEC/EU) and then attempt to devise an operationalization of political opportunity structure that can
overcome at least some of these problems.
II. Institutional changes in EEC and the opening of political
opportunities for protest
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European Community, or the project of European Integration? Even though the European Union is
not (yet) a full-fledged polity comparable to that of the individual European states, its development is
in many respects analogous to the process of state formation, and it has been increasingly taking on
state like characteristics (Grant 1993; Marks and McAdam 1996). Observers have suggested that
these changes constitute emerging political opportunity structures for participation and influence on
the EU level that can be expected to lead to the evolution of new forms and strategies of political
contention.
Thus, structural changes on the level of supranational power affect the balance of national policy
competencies and traditional power arrangements between subnational and national actors and in
turn transform the politics of collective action: "shifts in the geographic locus of institutionalized
power can be expected to be accompanied by simultaneous changes in the structure and locus of
mass politics." (Marks and McAdam 1996, 250) There is already sound evidence in the areas of
regional mobilization (Marks et al. 1996), interest group politics and lobbying activities within the
European Union in response to changes in the institutional constellation/balance within the European
Union.
The time period investigated in this paper covers two major institutional reforms of the European
Community: the passing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, which revised the original
Treaty of Rome, and the Treaty on European Union (TEU), or Maastricht Treaty in 1992-93. The
stagnant period of "Eurosclerosis' in the late 1970s and early 1980s came to an end with the
appointment of new Commission president Jacques Delors in 1985. Plans for a Single European
Market (SEM) and steps toward the European Monetary Union (EMU) culminated in the passage of
the Single European Act (SEA). The implementation of the SEA in summer of 1987 was arguably
the most significant modification of the structure of the original Community at the time. More
importantly, the scope of majority voting in the Council of Ministers was expanded into areas that
hitherto required unanimous agreement (e.g. taxation, the relaxation of border controls, and workers'
rights). Furthermore, the scope of the Community's authority was extended into new policy areas, and
the European Parliament's power was increased vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers and the
Commission (see e.g. Nicoll and Salmon 1993, Archer and Butler 1996). Mazey and Richardson
(1993a: 37) consider the passing of the SEA as a "watershed" for the process of integration that had
important implications for the activities and impact of sub-national actors operating within the
institutional environment of the European Communities. The SEA led to a significant increase in
lobbying activity in Brussels and Strasbourg. Due to the SEA, the EC now has a legal basis in a
number of policy areas in which it can act more independently from national governments.
Consequently, the ”reform of its decision-making process has begun to weaken governments’
influence at the EC level.” (Mazey and Richardson 1993a: 37). This has potentially significant
consequences for the political agendas and strategies of citizen groups within the member countries: 
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[T]he primacy of EC law over national legislation means that no group can afford to
ignore EC legislative developments which might undermine policy compromises being
negotiated nationally. This is especially important in such areas as industrial policy and
regional policy, where intervention by national governments can be overruled and
reversed by the EC as being contrary to the principles of the single market. (Mazey and
Richardson 1993a: 43).
Compared to the Single European Act, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) was probably
considerably less dramatic in the scope of the institutional changes it brought about. However, it was
5 von 19 17.07.98 09:38
EIoP: Text 1998-005: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-005.htmto become strikingly more momentous as a symbol of the rising politicization of the European
integration project. To a considerable part the Maastricht Treaty was the result of the political
pressures to widen and deepen the institutions of the European Communities in the wake of German
unification, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting shifts in the configurations of political
power among some of the member states within the existing framework. Richard McAllister (1997:
225) characterized the Maastricht Treaty's final form as janus-faced, containing both
"intergovernmentalist" and "federalist" elements. According to Mazey and Richardson (1993b: 3),
the Maastricht Treaty continued the "erosion of the powers of individual national governments." The
main points of the Treaty were the commitment to a common European currency by 1999 at the
latest; it laid down rights for European citizens and expanded on the concept Union citizenship; the
European Union obtained new powers in a number of areas (such as consumer protection; public
health; visa policy; establishment of trans-European transport, telecommunications and energy
networks; provisions for cooperation; industrial policy; education; culture; greater importance for
environmental protection; increase in research and development; progress on social policy;
co-operation in field of justice and home affairs) and it introduced a Common foreign and security
policy (CFSP).
While the Treaty constituted a partial retreat from more ambitious visions of a federalized and
supranational Europe in a number of areas (the principle of subsidiarity in Article 3b and changes in
Article A), it nevertheless (if only hesitantly) addressed the increasing awareness of the potentially
destabilizing aspects of the democratic deficit within the European Communities. In the TEU the
member countries agreed on altering the power relationship within the EEC's institutional structure:
mostly by limiting some of the Commission's and Council of Minister's powers vis-à-vis its only
directly elected institution, the European Parliament in Strasbourg. In the "Europhoria" that had
accompanied the negotiations of the TEU, the required national ratification procedures were
subsequently considered to constitute merely pro forma steps in passing the Treaty. French president
François Mitterand resorted to a grand, DeGaulleian gesture of having the ratification settled through
a referendum - a decision that turned out to by ill-advised. The trouble for the Maastricht Treaty
started with its rejection in the first Danish referendum on 2 June 1992 and culminated in the
razor-thin "yes"-vote in the French Referendum almost four months later.(2)
In sum, during the sixteen years between 1980 and 1995 the process of European Integration
underwent several significant institutional reforms that strengthened the European dimension and
created an increasingly favorable environment for the articulation of grievances through contentious
collective action.
III. European integration and the expanding arena for political
activism
Until recently, most research that has been conducted to address the role of citizens and their input
into the European political process has focused on electoral turnout, the politics of institutionalized
interest groups (e.g. Mazey and Richardson 1993a, Greenwood, Grote, and Ronit 1992), or the role
of public opinion (Niedermayer and Sinnott 1995).
A number of scholars have now begun to examine issues of contentious politics as a response to the
increasing degree of integration into the EU (notably, Tarrow 1995a; Imig and Tarrow 1997; Marks
and McAdam 1993; Opp 1994; and Rucht 1996a) thus adding a different and new perspective on the
process of supranational integration within the European Union that has previously been neglected.
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suggestions and the concepts of the literature on protest and social movements, particularly the
notion of POS. Therefore, the examination of issues relating to European protest can in turn shed
light on broader, theoretical puzzles and debates.
Routinely, the national level of POS has been considered to be predominant (e.g. Jenkins and
Klandermans 1995). Scholars of POS regard the state as the foremost conflict and alliance system
shaping the emergence of protest movements. However, considering the declining role the state
within the European Community outlined before, it is rather straightforward to assume a growing
role of "supranational" political opportunity structure as well: the domestic POS becomes
increasingly complemented by new forms of opportunities for protest that form within the framework
of EU politics (e.g. Kriesi 1995). 
Furthermore, much of the previous research on POS has dealt with the manifestation of protest
events as they are linked with particular national social movements and their respective organizations
and not the occurrence of contentious politics events per se. Social movements are understood as a
sustained series of interaction between the state and challenging groups (e.g. Jenkins and
Klandermans 1995). However, European protesters are not social movements in this sense. Rather,
European protest is conducted by a wide variety of actors with a multitude of different claims and
agendas. An only small fraction of those protest manifestations address the project of European
integration as such, and those events do not maintain the perceivable momentum and frequency that
would allow us to qualify them as a social movement. For most protesters the link between their
social, economic or political claims and the European Union is neither a persistent nor an exclusive
one. By and large, European protesters are concerned with immediate and specific issues such as
farm subsidies, unemployment or working conditions, whose targets can simultaneously consist of
their own governments, the European Union institutions, or other member countries' governments.
Thus, the phenomenon of Europeanization of protest does not lend itself to the same classificatory
homogeneity than for example the phenomenon of New Social Movements did in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. 
Marks and McAdam (1996) highlight the definitional boundaries of the concept of social movements
within the context of European integration and compare the process of supranational integration in its
effects on changing opportunity structures during the emergence of nation-states. Therefore, they are
critical of applying concepts to the study of European mass politics that are "historically contingent"
and "inextricably linked to the historic rise and refinement of a national system of politics" (Marks
and McAdam 1996: 251). In a similar vein, they question the theoretical distinctions between interest
groups and social movements in the EU context, because all are "challenging groups" that thus stand
in the same relationship to the "integration process"
Consequently, I broaden my unit of analysis to protest events as such – the collective and public
action of citizens that are attempting to alter the representation system of the European Union,
influence its public policies both on the national and supranational level, or the general relationship
between citizens and both the states or the EU institutions – contending that some of the
classificatory tools of the theoretical literature are too narrow and ill-suited for studying the
manifestation of supranational protest. 
I define protest broadly as including politically, socially as well as economically motivated
non-institutionalized action intended to exert pressure on other social actors, state institutions and
policies, as well as on the institutions or representatives of the European union (e.g. Opp 1994).
These forms of protest can include demonstrations, strikes, blockades, the signing of petitions,
hunger strikes, bombings and other forms of public and contentious collective action. 
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are directed towards issues without explicit connection to the European Union, that I subsume under
the broad category of "domestic protest", and ”European protest.” Following Tarrow (1995a) I define
”European protest” as any protest event that 
(a) either explicitly addresses the EU polity, its policies, institutions, or the project of integration as
such, or is directed towards national/domestic policies, which presumably, emerged due to and
affected by the European Union. Here, protesters attempt to address the EEC/EU, an issue of
EEC/EU policy, their national governments or other member governments as an agent of desired
policy change in addition to the respective national agency, or 
(b) is targeted at domestic state policies that are seen to represent a conflict between domestic
interests and EU interests.
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IV. Data(3)
The data on protest underlying this research are event data that have been manually coded, and
collected from multiple, electronically available full-text news sources, using the on-line news
service Lexis/Nexis. The availability of on-line news archives like Lexis/Nexis allows the use of
multiple sources that increase coverage and verifiability of news content without compromising the
parsimony and efficiency of the data collection.(4) 
We chose to use the Reuters Textline service within Lexis/Nexis as our media source. The Textline
service records stories from over 400 media organizations, including English language translations of
many European sources. Although several of the media sources recorded in Textline are not likely to
contribute any useful information to our project (i.e. specialized publications like Carpet and
Floorcovering Review) this service contains several major news sources (like Reuters, BBC, Agence
France Presse, International Herald Tribune) as well as regional media outlets that are likely to
cover the local events ignored by the major media sources. Table 1 provides a summary of the
coverage by different sources. Reuters News service clearly provides the backbone the events in the
data set accounting for between over half to more than two thirds of the protest events. 
Table 1
Through the Boolean search capabilities of Lexis/Nexis we can effectively limit the number of stories
we obtain and that provide the basis of the coding. For example, the search phrase "France or
Germany" would return all stories involving either France or Germany, but the phrase "France or
Germany and protest" will yield only those stories that contain one of the two countries' names and
the word "protest." By using in our search commands several terms that one would expect to find in a
story regarding domestic protest – such as "protest," "riot", "demonstrator," etc.) we were able to
eliminate a large number of irrelevant stories. This presents a departure from previous efforts in the
systematic collection of data on collective action or protest, each relying on different sources and
employing different methods of data collection (Tilly 1978, 1986; Tarrow 1989; Kriesi et al. 1995,
Rucht et al. 1992, McCarthy, McPhail and Smith 1996; for a review see Olzak 1989, 1992).
We increase the efficiency of the information processing stage through the use of the
machine-assisted coding using the Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) (Schrodt 1996), a computer
program that "reads" the news stories and makes initial coding decisions for many of our variables.
This method differs from similar projects employing machines such as the PANDA project (Bond et
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machine-coding, where the computer program makes automatic coding decisions based on dictionary
and actor lists. Instead human coders look at every news story and analyze its content for predefined
variables. Second, we use a variety of sources instead of relying on single-source coding. And third,
we code full-text stories instead of headlines and the lead-paragraph. The data are collected by event
and for the present analysis aggregated by six-month periods.
I discuss the operationalization of the political opportunity structure concept, the independent
variable, in the next section. 
V. Testing POS in the European Context
The discussion above showed that one of the weaknesses of the POS concept is the ambiguity that
results from the clustering of explanatory variables under its label. This has serious implications for
practical research: if one were to incorporate all aspects of POS into any research design (see e.g.
Gamson and Meyer 1996: 281 for a list of POS components), this would quickly exhaust any
explanatory power in a typical small-N study. In following Tarrow's advice (1996: 800) who
advocates pinning down political opportunity structure in a "more testable and widely accepted
form," I will attempt the first part and hope for the second. 
The changes due to European integration can be linked to at least the first three of the four
dimensions of political opportunity structure presented earlier: First, and with respect to the relative
openness or closure of the institutionalized national political system, the emergence of the European
Community/European Union simply offers a variety of new possibilities in accessing and shaping
nascent political processes forming at the supranational level (see Marks and McAdam 1996). This
can be dubbed a "political opportunity structure differential." With this I mean that we could expect
groups hampered by rather closed and inaccessible domestic political structures, e.g. France's, to be
more inclined to make use of additional channels of access at the European level than domestic
actors in other countries encountering more favorable and responsive circumstances for influencing
policy formation and implementation (such as Germany and Belgium). 
Secondly, the expansion of policy fields and the shift of policy powers from the national to the
supranational level should affect the nature of established national elite alignments by allowing
political actors to search for political allies outside of their national boundaries (Milner and Keohane
1996a, and Marks et al. 1996 on the formation of cross-national linkages among regional
movements). Furthermore and due to the intergovernmental aspects of the EU integration project,
these processes open a relatively wide array of possibilities for nationally based as well as
supranationally operating movement alliances to exploit the disagreements and conflicting agendas
between and within their respective governments.
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Next, in the literature on political opportunity structure the role of third party support or the presence
of elite allies has been consistently found to be a central aspect for the formation of protest (Burstein
et al. 1995, Tarrow 1983, 1989). Within the context of European integration the institutions and
processes of the EU offers a new set of constellations in gaining potential elite allies. In the words of
Mény (1989: 363; cited in Ladrech 1994):
The State is no longer in a position to ‘guarantee’ policy output nor to assure selected intermediaries
a monopoly of access to effective centres of decision; as for the groups, they can, if they wish, utilize
a range of interventions larger and more open than has been the case or even, when they are
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Therefore, groups can choose between a variety of allies and targets for their actions, depending on
the utility that differing constellations can offer. Marks and McAdam (1996) provide the most
systematic treatment of the possible emergence of POS at the European level. Marks and McAdam
(1996: 251) summarize the general argument:
to the extent that European integration results in the replacement, or, more likely, the decline in the
importance of the nation-state as the exclusive seat of formal political power, we can expect
attendant changes in those forms of interest aggregation/articulation historically linked to the state.
In brief, institutional changes brought about by the European integration process can be regarded as
an opening of political spaces for the articulation of grievances in several ways: (1) its institutional
setting provides a new forum and new channels of influence; (2) through the increased politicization
of the integration process, groups can attain publicity beyond their traditional target groups; (3) it
creates the possibility to form alliances with a larger number of actors outside of the nation-state, (4)
it limits the judicial and legislative capacity and independence of states, and (5) in that it reduces the
nation-states' ability to produce binding outputs for the challengers.
For this paper I focus on the first aspect of the institutional differential between the states' domestic
structural setting and the possibilities offered by the expanded protest environment of the European
Union. Based on the theoretical suggestions of the POS literature I examine whether cross-national
differences in the absolute number of European protest events coincide with the differences between
Belgium's, France's, the Federal Republic of Germany's respective institutional structures. Thus I
attempt to integrate the POS's static aspects with the notion of change and the opening of POS. I
understand the domestic political opportunities as providing the static structural background against
which potential supranational opportunities evolve on the European level.(5) Even, if we assume that
protesters have to take their domestic political opportunity structure as given (Kriesi 1995: 168), they
can anticipate and react to the changes provided by the integration of the European Union.
Specifically, I concentrate on the broadest characteristic of institutional differences, the countries'
degree of institutional openness to challengers as reflected in the system's degree of centralization.
The assumption is that a more closed political structure is more likely to lead to an expansion of
domestic protest, to include European issues, policies and targets. Groups mobilizing and acting
within a more closed political system will tend to be more inclined to make use of new opportunities
at the European level because those new opportunities can empower them more than groups in other,
comparatively open and accessible systems who can already be heard more easily within their
traditional domestic setting.
Kriesi's (1995: 171) classification of cross-national POS provides a useful starting point: he stresses
that formal access to the national political system is determined by: (1) the degree of (territorial)
centralization: the more decentralized the state structure the more access points it offers; (2) degree
of (functional) concentration of state power: the more dispersed/separation of powers, the easier is
access; (3) coherence of the public administration: the greater coherence, the greater is the state's
ability to restrict the challengers' access; (4) degree to which direct democratic procedures are
institutionalized. Based on these characteristics he distinguishes between ”open” and ”closed” states.
I choose to limit the operationalization of POS to this institutional dimension, because it best and
most cogently embodies the concepts original and structural notion that is arguably at the core of the
POS concept in its most essential and compelling form. 
Consistent with Marks et al.'s "regional autonomy index" (1996), Lane and Ersson's "institutional
autonomy index" (1991), and Bullmann's classification (1997) I proceed to rank-order the three
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the regional governance. 
Of the three countries France comes closest to the notion of a closed state and classic unitary country.
The French Fifth Republic is characterized by an extremely closed and centralized decision-making
system. This is compounded by its fairly inaccessible party-system on the national level. France
comprises 21 administrative regions containing 96 departments. Beginning in 1982 France under
President Mitterand and the socialist government initiated a process of reform and limited
devolution, moving the system closer to what Bullmann (1997) calls 'devolving unitary:' a system
that underwent a "process of reform to establish elected regional authorities above the local level...
[which] enjoys a certain degree of constitutional protection and autonomy." The decentralization law
of March 1982 transferred administrative and financial power in France from the level of préfets to
locally-elected departmental assemblies. Thus, although these reforms established elected regional
authorities above the local level, France's centralized structure of governance with its limited
numbers of access at all levels continues to be the least "hospitable" political system of the three for
protesters to successfully advance their claims (see also Rucht 1996b; Kriesi et al. 1995; Kitschelt
1986). 
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Next in the ranking, I place Belgium as representing a 'regionalized unitary' (Bullmann 1997) or
'semi-federal' (Fitzmaurice 1996) system. Beginning in the 1960s, the Belgium state has been
undergoing a process of decentralization after the old unitary state became increasingly
ungovernable. The was mostly due to the emergence and deepening of the language or community
cleavage mainly between the Flemish-speaking Flanders in the north and French-speaking Wallonia,
or Wallony, in the south. "[F]rom 1970, the date of the first major constitutional revision, Belgium
began to move towards a more complex structure of the federal type. The process is still going on
and is far from complete, but already the Belgian state has taken on important federal characteristics
with devolution of significant powers to the communities and regions." (Fitzmaurice 1996: 83). Over
the last two decades a number of amendments to the Constitution that represented important
revisions in connection with the Reform of the State were passed (in 1980, 1983, 1988, 1993). Most
observers characterize Belgium as moving towards a form of federalized structure. In the words of
Fitzmaurice (1996: 145): "Few would now contest that Belgium's institutions are evolving in a
federal direction and that they show many sui generis features, that, while not found in other federal
systems and while lacking some features normally found in federal systems, certainly do not
disqualify Belgium from being considered virtually a federal state."(6) This cooperative climate is
also reflected in the general pattern of interest mediation in Belgium (van den Bulk 1992, Compston
1994). One of its key characteristics is the system of 'pillarization' or verzuiling, leading to an
arrangement of relations between networks of social and economic actors, political parties and the
state, making Belgium "an example par excellence of a co-sociational democracy" (Fitzmaurice
1996: 222). Another unique feature of the Belgian form of federalism is that the federal and
sub-national levels are not layered hierarchically: a federal law cannot alter a sub-national law nor
can it alter a subnational executive decision (Kerremans and Beyers 1997: 42).
Based on this classification and according to the suggestions of the POS literature, Belgium's
political structure would allow for comparatively more possibilities for social actors to gain access to
the political system and would make it less necessary for the citizens to engage in European protest.
Finally, the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) constitutional scope for regional governance is the
largest of the three countries. The FRG constitutes the classic federal system in this triad in that the
"regional tier exists in its own right and cannot be abolished ... unilaterally."(Bullmann 1997)
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and government. These state assemblies have far-reaching rights to enact their own state-laws in
areas such as education, police, culture and environmental protection. Thus, the FRG is characterized
by "institutional permeability" and constitutes the most typical federal system among the three
countries. With respect to the POS it provides, Kriesi et al. (1995: 220) characterize the Federal
Republic of Germany as an example of a comparatively "weak state." Furthermore, decision-making
powers are fragmented along the federal dimension and provide numerous access points for
challenging groups through e.g. administrative courts and other institutions (Rucht 1996b: 200-201).
The system also provides for the "formalistic inclusion" of other societal actors in the policy
formation process. In addition, the execution and implementation of federal and state laws is to a
large extent the local responsibility of city boroughs and counties.
Figure 1 summarizes the rank-ordering of the three countries based on the previous discussion. While
the comparative institutional structure and thus the domestic POS is for the most part stable, the
classification takes into account the changes that particularly France and Belgium (indicated by the
arrows and boxes representing the institutional reforms), and to a much smaller extent Germany (e.g.
Deeg 1995), underwent since the 1980s.(7)
Figure 1
This operationalization attempts to conform to two essential conditions for sound research design: it
results in a dependent variable that varies,(8) and, more importantly, it allows for a research design
whose efficiency mirrors the attributed explanatory power of the underlying theoretical concept (see
King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 42).
VI. Results
Based on this classification, I now turn to comparing the relationship between the countries'
institutional political opportunity structures and the occurrence of European protest events. 
The null hypothesis is that there is no systematic relationship between the differences in the
countries' institutional structures and the occurrence of European protest. The alternative hypothesis
is then, that the rank-ordering of the occurrence of the number of European protest events in each of
the three countries corresponds to the rank ordering of the degree of territorial centralization – that is
in the order France, Belgium, Germany – at least in the majority of each of the thirty-two six-month
periods between 1980 and 1995.
Table 2 Table 3
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Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for the biyearly aggregation and Table 3 shows the total
number of European protest events, their relative rank-order in brackets, and the sequence of the
event frequency across the three countries. It is noticeable that there is no clear trend reflecting a
steady increase in protest activity directed towards the EEC/EU over time. The protest event data is
dominated by long periods of torpor interrupted by relatively short periods of intensive activity. The
distribution of protest events appears rather bimodal with heightened activity in the early to mid
1980s, a period of relative calm stretching from the mid- to late 1980s and again a stronger and more
sustained upsurge beginning by the early 1990s.(9) 
Table 4
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count in Table 4. In addition to the sequence count for the total number of protesters, table 4 also
reports two subsamples – farmers and non-farmers. Farmers are the not only the most successful and
best organized Community-level pressure group (Grant 1993), but they are also the most active
European protesters in France and Germany, accounting for close to sixty percent of all European
protests. As Table 3 indicates, there are several time periods were there were either no events, or the
same number of events in all three countries. These instances did not enter into the sequence count.
For the cases where the number of European protest events were equal in two of the three countries I
assigned the two event frequency sequences that are consistent with the respective relative event
counts. 
The sequence France-Belgium-Germany receives the highest count – both overall, as well as for the
farmer subsample. In seventeen out of the thirty-two time periods, the sequence predicted by the
concept of political opportunity structure differential is realized. Only in the case of non-farmers the
pattern is somewhat ambivalent. European protest events by non-farmers in Belgium tend to
outnumber those in both France and Germany: in twelve out of the thirty-two periods there were
more protest events in Belgium than in both France and Germany – compared to eleven periods, that
are in concordance with the propositions of the POS concept. Furthermore, the count also decreases
with the number of transpositions in the sequences consistent with the structural argument. The
strong showing of non-farmer protest in Belgium over France and Germany is in part caused by labor
conflicts between EEC staff working for the EEC bureaucracies situated in Brussels.
Table 5
In order to assess the significance of these findings I conduct two statistical tests: A crosstabulation
analysis of the rank-ordering (reported in Table 5), and an ANOVA test of the original event counts
(Table 6). 
Since the political structure is clearly the independent variable, and the protest event frequency is the
dependent, an asymmetric coefficient like Somers' D is the appropriate statistic to assess the
association between the two ordinal measures.(10) Somers' D indicates a fairly strong and positive
relationship between the relative occurrence of European protest events and the countries' political
opportunity structure differential. Moreover, the Chi-square measure indicates that this relationship is
statistically significant. These findings are further supported by the ANOVA test of the association of
original protest counts before having been translated into ordinal variables with the degree of
territorial centralization.
Table 6
These findings lend support to the alternative hypothesis: If the institutional opportunity structure
were irrelevant for the relative frequency of European protest across the three countries, and the null
hypothesis were true, we would expect the counts to be distributed more equally or randomly and not
follow the pattern predicted by the theory. Based on the two tests we can confidently reject the null
hypothesis that there is no relationship between the two variables.
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VII. Concluding remarks
This paper set out to explain the rates of European protest in three core countries of the EEC/EU
13 von 19 17.07.98 09:38
EIoP: Text 1998-005: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-005.htmbased on their institutional differences as suggested by the literature on political opportunity
structures. The analysis thus has a dual purpose: first, to find out more about the dynamics of the
Europeanization of protest and second, to provide an answer to the wider theoretical question of the
relationship between political opportunity structures and contentious collective action.
With respect to the first issue, the findings support the notion of a Europeanization of protest that is
spurred by the changing constellation of national vs. supranational powers in the wake of European
integration. Furthermore, the Europeanization of protest occurs displaying systematic cross-national
differences. These differences are, as the results suggest, related to the differential between the
constraints of the actors' domestic environments and the common-to-all evolving opportunities on the
level of European politics.
This leads to the second goal of the paper: While we ultimately cannot predict the occurrence of
single protest events (Kuran 1991), these findings do suggest that the rates of protest in
cross-national perspective are not simply random (Lichbach 1995). The macro-political structure
plays a (statistically) significant, logically consistent, and visible role in the explanatory bundle
leading to occurrence or absence of protest actions. 
However, the results provide a suspiciously ”simple structural answer to complex political
problems.”(Tarrow 1994: 91) While the research design attempts to operationalize the notion of POS
in a testable way, it is difficult to assess how convincing these results are in a larger perspective. This
research and the findings are the product of several assumptions. The most important of which is
narrowing the notion of POS down to its institutional dimension, thus not controlling for the other
dimensions of POS such as informal political alignments, the repressive capacity the political
systems etc. 
At a closer look, the findings also indicate that structural explanations can only be a partial
explanation of mobilization. In the Appendix I report the analyses for the two subsamples (farmer
and non-farmer European protest): They show that the structural explanation loses some of its
explanatory power when we disaggregate and shift our focus on how the systems' overall political
structures translate into, and interact with individual groups' motivations and strategies.(11)
This does not need to be contradictory, though. No single research endeavor can exhaustively test all
alternative hypothesis. Rather, these results could encourage and suggest different avenues for further
research. 
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Endnotes
(*) This research was supported by the Eisenhower World Affairs Institute and NSF Grant,
#SBR-9631229, Ronald A. Francisco principal investigator. My thanks to Ron Francisco, Phil
Schrodt, Phil Huxtable and Marc Simon for their help and comments, and to Astrid Obst for the
collection of the data on Belgium. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 1998, Chicago.
(1) McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald's (1996: 10) account differs on the last dimension: In their
typology the state's capacity and propensity for repression is the fourth dimension of POS. 
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EIoP: Text 1998-005: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-005.htm(2) These shifts in the policy competencies and powers from the nation-state to the European level
were the bases for a legal challenge put before the German Constitutional Court during the
ratification process of the TEU in 1993 by a motley coalition of Greens, far-right Republicans, and a
former German senior Commission official. Their complaint was that the TEU violated the German
basic law by giving too many of its powers to Brussels (Nicoll and Salmon 1994: 229). Another case
in point is the adaptation of the social protocol by eleven of the twelve member states during the
negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 which was in part motivated by the necessity to ”retain
the support of workers and their representatives for the integration project” (Lange 1993: 8).
(3) This section is based on Reising, Francisco, Huxtable 1997.
(4) For more detail on the project and data collection process see Reising, Francisco, and Huxtable
1997.
(5) Following Rucht's (1996b) reminder that structural analysis needs a common reference point to
be meaningful this analysis holds that the EU provides the common reference point for a meaningful
comparison in the explanatory power of the POS concept for the differences in protest rate
occurrences across the three countries.
(6) Witte (1992: 113-115) characterizes Belgian federalism as "unionist" and "co-operative";
'unionist' because "there is a fairly strong political current working to restrict any far-reaching
autonomy for the communities or the regions." The 'co-operative' feature places much importance to
discussion and collaboration between the regions, communities and the federal state. e.g. "solidarity
grant" (similar to horizontal equalization in Germany)
(7) These domestic developments are secondary, however, since this research is only concerned with
a consistent relative rank-ordering with respect to the common reference point – the EEC/EU.
(8) Admittedly a minimum condition. But in one of the "standard" dataset for structural comparisons,
Polity III (Jaggers and Gurr 1996), there is neither variation over the sixteen year period, nor
differences between the three countries under study here.
(9) Public opinion research finds an almost uniform 'Europeanization' of opinion" between 1981-85,
in the years before the beginning of the Single Market (Everts and Sinnott 1995) 
(10) Somer' D also takes into account the tied pairs on the dependent variable.
(11) See for example Rucht's (1996a) findings on the relative powerlessness of environmental groups
at the European level or Marks and McAdam's (1996) comparative analysis of different movements'
responses to European integration.
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Coding Sources (in percent)
Source \
Country 
BBC  CSM  ECON  FT  Le Monde  Reuters  SDZ  Xinhua  other  N 
Belgium  2.22  0.19  3.71  7.11  0.00  56.63  0.00  3.67  26.48  2617 
France  0.21  0.34  0.45  3.14  6.77  54.42  0.00  4.20  30.46  15295 
FRG  0.12  0.65  0.08  1.77  0.05  71.62  4.82  6.66  14.21  7503 
mean  0.85  0.39  1.41  4.01  2.28  60.89  1.61  4.85  23.72 
BBC 
British Broadcast Cooperation 
CSM 
Christian Science Monitor 
ECON 
Economist 
FT 
Financial Times 
SDZ 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Biyearly European Protest Counts
(N=32)
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  Variance  Minimum  Maximum 
Belgian protest (total)  14.25  25.15  632.32  0  100 
Belgian protest (farmers)  .88  1.60  2.56  0  6 
Belgian protest (without farmers) 13.38  24.76  613.15  0  96 
French protest (total)  21.69  30.59  935.96  0  120 
French protest (farmers)  13.03  23.21  538.81  0  108 
French protest (without farmers)  8.66  14.05  197.33  0  62 
German protest (total)  2.97  3.84  14.74  0  15 
German protest (farmers)  1.78  3.44  11.85  0  15 
German protest (without farmers) 1.19  2.13  4.54  0  9 
Table 3
Number of European protest events and rank-order of event
frequency (1980-1995: six-month aggregation)
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1980-1  2 
[1] 
0 
[2] 
0 
[2] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
France-Germany-Belgium 
1980-2  0 
[2] 
0 
[2] 
5 
[1] 
Germany-Belgium-France 
Germany-France-Belgium 
1981-1  2 
[2] 
33 
[1] 
0 
[3] 
Belgium-France-Germany 
1981-2  1 
[-] 
1 
[-] 
1 
[-] 
1982-1  10 
[2] 
100 
[1] 
0 
[3] 
Belgium-France-Germany 
1982-2  1 
[1] 
0 
[2] 
0 
[3] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
France-Germany-Belgium 
1983-1  21 
[1] 
7 
[2] 
1 
[3] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
1983-2  3 
[2] 
73 
[1] 
1 
[3] 
Belgium-France-Germany 
1984-1  43 
[1] 
7 
[2] 
1 
[3] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
1984-2  3 
[1] 
1 
[2] 
0 
[3] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
1985-1  34 
[1] 
1 
[2] 
0 
[3] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
1985-2  6 
[1] 
1 
[2] 
1 
[2] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
France-Germany-Belgium 
1986-1  2 
[2] 
0 
[3] 
4 
[1] 
Germany-France-Belgium 
1986-2  16 
[1] 
0 
[2] 
0 
[2] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
France-Germany-Belgium 
1987-1  7 
[2] 
3 
[3] 
15 
[1] 
Germany-France-Belgium 
1987-2  0 
[2] 
1 
[1] 
0 
[2] 
Belgium-France-Germany 
Belgium-Germany-France 
1988-1  11 
[1] 
1 
[3] 
7 
[2] 
France-Germany-Belgium 
1988-2  0 
[-] 
0 
[-] 
0 
[-] 
1989-1  5 
[1] 
3 
[2] 
3 
[2] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
France-Germany-Belgium 
1989-2  1 
[1] 
0 
[2] 
0 
[2] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
France-Germany-Belgium 
1990-1  30 
[1] 
2 
[3] 
10 
[2] 
France-Germany-Belgium 
1990-2  8 
[1] 
6 
[2] 
1 
[3] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
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[2] 
6 
[1] 
0 
[3] 
Belgium-France-Germany 
1991-2  52 
[1] 
2 
[3] 
3 
[2] 
France-Germany-Belgium 
1992-1  120 
[1] 
5 
[2] 
4 
[3] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
1992-2  100 
[1] 
14 
[2] 
6 
[3] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
1993-1  91 
[1] 
43 
[2] 
9 
[3] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
1993-2  41 
[1] 
41 
[1] 
7 
[3] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
Belgium-France-Germany 
1994-1  20 
[1] 
4 
[2] 
4 
[2] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
France-Germany-Belgium 
1994-2  7 
[3] 
13 
[1] 
10 
[2] 
Belgium-Germany-France 
1995-1  21 
[2] 
53 
[1] 
1 
[3] 
Belgium-France-Germany 
1995-2  34 
[1] 
2 
[2] 
1 
[3] 
France-Belgium-Germany 
The first row denotes the number of protest events and the numbers in paranthesis in the second row
indicate the rank-order of event frequency among the three countries. 
Table 4
Sequence count of European protest
Sequence count  all protesters  farmers  non-farmers 
France-Belgium-Germany  17  16  11 
France-Germany-Belgium  10  15  3 
Belgium-France-Germany  7  1  12 
Belgium-Germany-France  2  1  5 
Germany-Belgium-France  1  1  1 
Germany-France-Belgium  3  3  1 
Table 5
Crosstabulation of relative event frequency and relative degree
of territorial centralization (for all protest events)
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Expected Value 
France 
(high) 
Belgium 
(medium) 
Germany 
(low) 
Row Total 
1  20 
10.3 
8 
10.3 
3 
10.3 
31 
34.4% 
2  9 
12.7 
17 
12.7 
12 
12.7 
38 
42.2% 
3  1 
7.0 
5 
7.0 
15 
7.0 
21 
23.3% 
Column Total  30 
33.3% 
30 
33.3% 
30 
33.3% 
90 
100% 
Number of Missing Observations: 6 Somers' D .50593 Chi-Square 32.21028 (4 DF; significance:
.00000) 
Table 6
Analysis of Variance For All Protest Events
Source  degrees of
freedom 
Sums of
Squares 
Mean
Square 
F-ratio  Probability 
Territorial
Centralization 
2  5622.02  2811.01  5.5286  0.0054 
Error  93  47285.9  508.451 
Total  95  52907.96 
Appendix
Table A1
Crosstabulation of relative event frequency and relative degree
of territorial centralization (only farmer protest)
Observed Count 
Expected Value 
France 
(high) 
Belgium 
(medium) 
Germany 
(low) 
Row Total 
1  21 
8.7 
1 
8.7 
4 
8.7 
26 
33.3% 
2  4 
12.3 
17 
12.3 
16 
12.3 
37 
47.4% 
3  1 
5.0 
8 
5.0 
6 
5.0 
15 
19.2% 
Column Total  26 
33.3% 
26 
33.3% 
26 
33.3% 
78 
100.0% 
4 von 6 17.07.98 09:39
EIoP: Text 1998-005: Tables http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-005t.htmNumber of Missing Observations: 18 Somers' D .43442 Chi-Square 40.53264 (significance: .00000) 
Table A2
Analysis of Variance For Farmer Protest
Source  degrees of
freedom 
Sums of
Squares 
Mean
Square 
F-ratio  Probability 
Territorial
Centralization 
2  2935.02  1467.51  7.9580  0.0006 
Error  93  17149.9  184.408 
Total  95  20085.0 
Table A3
Crosstabulation of relative event frequency and relative degree
of territorial centralization (all non-farmer protest)
Observed Count 
Expected Value 
France 
(high) 
Belgium 
(medium) 
Germany 
(low) 
Row Total 
1  14 
8.7 
11 
8.7 
1 
8.7 
26 
34.7% 
2  9 
10.3 
14 
10.3 
8 
10.3 
31 
41.3% 
3  2 
6.0 
0 
6.0 
16 
6.0 
18 
24.0% 
Column Total  25 
33.3% 
25 
33.3% 
25 
33.3% 
75 
100% 
Number of Missing Observations: 21 Somers' D .51947 Chi-Square 38.02564 (significance: .00000) 
Table A4
Analysis of Variance For Non-Farmer Protest
Source  degrees of
freedom 
Sums of
Squares 
Mean
Square 
F-ratio  Probability 
Territorial
Centralization 
2  2070.19  1035.09  4.1116  0.0195 
Error  93  23412.97  251.752 
Total  95  25483.16 
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Temporal changes and the comparative degree of (territorial)
centralization
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